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THE FOUNDATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF
PARTICIPATION: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
FLANDERS
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS*
Voting is the foundational concept for our entire democratic structure.
We think of voting as a fundamental—the most fundamental—right in our
democracy. When a group of citizens collectively elects its representatives,
it affirms the notion that we govern ourselves by free choice. An
individual’s right to vote ties that person to our social order, even if that
person chooses not to exercise that right. Voting represents the beginning;
everything else in our democracy follows the right to vote. Participation is
more than just a value. It is a foundational virtue of our democracy.
Professor Chad Flanders, in a thought-provoking contribution to this
symposium issue, focuses on a narrower view of voting, minimizing its
inherent virtue as an individual right and maximizing the ideal of equality
to resolve election disputes.1 To Professor Flanders, although voting
certainly encompasses the notions of self-governance and democratic
expression, today’s clashes over elections and participation are really about
equality. Professor Flanders is a fantastic scholar, but I believe that this
view is too constricted.2 By focusing so much on equality, Professor
Flanders gives too short shrift to the power of the foundational importance
of voting and democratic participation to resolve our election
administration disputes.
Differentiating between protecting an individual’s right to vote per se
and merely ensuring equality among voters has both theoretical and
practical consequences. How should we conceive of and discuss the right to
vote and its associated controversies? Does the equality principle answer
our questions about how we should run our elections, or should we embrace
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. Thanks to
Professor Chad Flanders for spurring my thoughts on these ideas and asking me to respond
to his excellent article. Thanks also to Professor Ned Foley, Professor Mike Pitts, Professor
Michael Solimine, and former Constitutional Court of South Africa Judge Albie Sachs for
reviewing an early draft of this paper and providing valuable comments, and to Nathan Klein
for excellent research assistance.
1. See Chad Flanders, What Is the Value of Participation?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 53
(2013).
2. Indeed, despite our slight divergence on some points, we agree on many aspects of
how to analyze issues involving the right to vote. Moreover, Professor Flanders is a
colleague and friend whose work I admire greatly.
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more foundational concepts in resolving these disputes? The answers to
these theoretical questions have pragmatic implications: to what extent
should courts require election administrators to avoid voting problems such
as long lines, irrespective of whether they produce inequality? In my view,
we must not lose sight of voting as the foundational bedrock of our
democratic regime. If voting is so important to our continued democracy,
then the government should not place unnecessary barriers on the franchise,
even if those barriers affect all voters equally. It follows that governments,
which administer elections, have an affirmative obligation to remove any
unnecessary obstacles so that voting is as easy as practicable for everyone.
Put differently, if we believe that everyone should have a voice in our
democracy, then we should also eliminate avoidable burdens that might
affect all voters. Governments, as the first-line actors in the electoral
system, should better protect the individual right to vote by guaranteeing an
opportunity to participate for all voters.
This response proceeds in two parts. Part I examines the theoretical
underpinning of the right to vote as inherent in citizens in our democracy.
This flows from the notion that voting is a foundational concept for our
entire democratic regime and, indeed, the most fundamental right
individuals enjoy. To be clear, Professor Flanders acknowledges the
foundational importance of voting several times, but by emphasizing
equality within the “voting wars” I believe he passes over too quickly the
foundational concepts embedded within the right to vote. Both developing
and long-standing democracies have embraced the individual right to vote
as a first principle to their democratic structures and constitutional order;
the United States should be no different. Although the equality principle is
certainly significant as one component of protection, it does not tell the
whole story. Participation is important because it provides the bedrock
foundation for everything that follows in a democracy.3
3. The discussion over the emphasis of voting as foundational, and the corresponding
values to elevate in resolving election disputes, has its roots in political philosophy. See
generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1996); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (rev. ed., Harvard Press
1999) (1971). But the deeper philosophical discussion is beyond the scope of both Professor
Flanders’s article and this response, which consider instead primarily the real-world
application of this distinction. That is, although the starting principle for democracy impacts
the rules we adopt for our electoral system, the focus of our debate is not chiefly on which
philosophy is correct but instead on the soundness of the practical effects for election
administration. Moreover, we both agree that voting is a fundamental right and that equal
access is important; we differ only in which value we emphasize to decide election
controversies.
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Part II is more practical, focusing on the implications of understanding
participation as a right that encompasses a broader notion than just equality.
Professor Flanders asserts that if we are mainly striving for equality, then
obstacles to voting are not too concerning unless they affect voters
unequally. As one example, he considers the problem of long lines at the
polls. He admits that long wait times are bad, but he intimates that they are
not a dilemma in themselves requiring an immediate fix so long as the lines
are the same for everyone. As I explain in Part II, however, long lines are a
significant issue even if everyone must endure the same wait to vote
because they deter voting, reduce the vote count, and can even call into
question who won a close election. Further, the equality principle counsels
in favor of a deferential review of governmental election regulations, but
courts should be more vigilant in requiring states to remove unnecessary
barriers so that voting is as easy as practicable. With equality as the guiding
light, governments might revert to the “least common denominator” in their
election administration and do little more than strive for equality. The
broader concept of voting and participation as a foundational right places an
affirmative duty on governments to create an easy voting process and avoid
unreasonable obstacles, even if the barriers impact everyone the same. That
is, governments should not lose every election lawsuit, as they have
legitimate regulatory concerns and economic limitations, but courts should
more strictly review election rules to be consistent with the foundational
understanding of the right to vote.
I. Beyond Equality: Voting and Participation as a Foundational Principle
for Democracy
Professor Flanders admirably advances the debate on the meaning of
“participation” by crafting a typology of values inherent in voting, breaking
these values into four parts: legitimacy, expressiveness, information-giving,
and equality.4 I largely agree that voting, as a fundamental right, includes
these values.5 I am not as convinced, however, that equality is the most
important virtue in resolving what Professor Hasen has aptly described as
“The Voting Wars.”6

4. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 56-62.
5. I am also persuaded, however, that legitimacy and information-giving flow from
expression and equality. See Michael J. Pitts, P = E² and Other Thoughts on What Is the
Value of Participation?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 101 (2013).
6. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
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No one disputes that voting is a fundamental right. The question is what
value within the right to vote we should rely upon when resolving election
disputes. Professor Flanders gives greater priority to the equality interest in
participation, as opposed to a voter’s inherent interest in casting a ballot.
That is, where they clash, equality for the electorate as a whole seems to
trump protecting an individual’s right to vote, at least where it comes to
election controversies. He states that the issue of equal treatment is the
“rub”: “When does excluding somebody mean a violation of equal
treatment? And when does it not?”7 But this focus on equality obscures the
more important component of participation: the foundational aspect of
voting as a fundamental right to our democratic structure.
To be fair, Professor Flanders acknowledges several times that voting is
“foundational” to a democracy.8 He also touches upon this ideal through his
discussion of legitimacy; citing John Locke, he explains that one reason to
vote is to ensure that we achieve “the consent of the governed.”9 Indeed,
Professor Flanders asserts that “[n]o regime can be legitimate (we think) if
it does not allow the people in some fashion to choose its rules and its
rulers.”10
But the right to vote is not only about ensuring proper consent; it
encompasses broader ideals because it is foundational to the whole concept
of democracy. This foundational aspect of voting makes it a personal right
for every citizen living within a democratic regime.11 Voting is the bedrock
7. Flanders, supra note 1, at 61.
8. See, e.g., id. at 56-57, 61, 63.
9. See id. at 56 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1980) (1690)).
10. Id.
11. Although I discuss the fundamental right to vote in this context in individualistic
terms, there is also a strand of election law jurisprudence that understands voting as
structural, focusing on the ability of groups to influence the rules and laws under which they
are governed. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 41, 41 (2007) (“The right to vote is important, of course, for a variety of
individualistic reasons. It may be constitutive of citizenship, central to the inculcation of
civic virtue, and so on. But contemporary scholarship begins with the premise that the right
to vote is meaningful in large part because it affords groups of persons the opportunity to
join their voices to exert force on the political process.”). I do not mean explicitly to take a
particular position in this debate, as I agree that there is also a structural ideal within our
election system. Indeed, the “right to vote” has both “individual” and “structural”
components. See Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099,
1102 (2005); see also Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 176 n.207 (2008).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss1/4

2013]

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION

85

start of our entire governmental structure. Nothing happens—no one is
elected, meaning that no laws are passed—until there is a valid election.12
Professor Flanders does not necessarily disagree with this sentiment, but by
focusing so much on equality he glosses over this threshold principle.
Equality in voting is extremely important, but it should not be the end (or
even the beginning) of the inquiry. As the Supreme Court long ago
declared, in robustly recognizing voting rights under the United States
Constitution: “[S]tatutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation
of our representative society.”13 During the 2000 presidential election saga,
the Florida Supreme Court similarly explained that “an accurate vote count
is one of the essential foundations of our democracy.”14
Indeed, Professor Flanders tacitly recognizes that the foundational right
inherent in participation could resolve some election issues that the equality
principle would leave untouched. For example, he acknowledges that
focusing on equality opens up the possibility that the government could
take away the right to vote for all citizens and not infringe on this value, as
everyone would still have equal (albeit zero) access to vote.15 But, of
course, as Professor Flanders admits, a representative democracy will not
tolerate total disenfranchisement of its citizens. This reveals why the
foundational ideal of voting as an individual right can resolve some of the
“voting wars,” especially when equality cannot. Perhaps this is just a matter
of emphasis; Professor Flanders sees the equality principle doing most of
the work, but in my view this glosses over the significance of voting as a
first principle for democracy.

12. Of course, some governmental actors are appointed. But we live in a representative
democracy, in which we elect leaders to enact laws under which we will live. Moreover,
most appointed officials derive their authority either from a constitution (which is
democratically adopted) or an elected body. Thus, elections are the first step in our
democratic structure.
13. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). The Court went
on to explain that “[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in
political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government.” Id. Although this sentence speaks in terms of “discrimination,”
thus implicating equality, it also stands for the proposition that voting is a foundational
concept for our constitutional structure.
14. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1238 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom., Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000)
(per curiam).
15. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 61.
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The United States Supreme Court has long declared that voting is
“fundamental,”16 the “essence of a democratic society,”17 and “preservative
of all rights.”18 The United States Constitution’s protection of the right to
vote is “[u]ndeniabl[e].”19 In the seminal one person, one vote case of
Reynolds v. Sims, the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized.20
Although Reynolds was an Equal Protection Clause case, this language
suggests that when the United States Supreme Court entered the “political
thicket,”21 it did so under the guise of the foundational significance of
voting as the backbone of our democratic structure. An alleged
infringement required meticulous scrutiny.22
Democracies across the world also embrace a broad concept of voting
rights as foundational and use that ideal to resolve voting controversies.
South Africa, a young democracy, includes in its constitution an explicit
grant of the individual right to vote: “Every adult citizen has the right . . . to
vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the
Constitution, and to do so in secret . . . .”23 The Constitutional Court of
South Africa—the nation’s highest court for constitutional issues—
expounded upon this concept when it invalidated a felon
disenfranchisement law:

16. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966); cf.
Douglas, supra note 11, at 145.
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
18. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
19. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
20. Id. at 561-62.
21. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (coining this phrase).
22. As discussed below, the Court has since backed off of this lofty language through
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. See infra Part II.C.
23. S. AFR. CONST. § 19, 1996. This is unlike the United States Constitution, which
discusses the right to vote only in the “negative” and does not explicitly confer the right to
vote upon its citizens. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions,
67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). Every state constitution, however, includes an
explicit grant of the right to vote to the states’ citizens. Id.
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Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the
foundational values of our entire constitutional order. The
achievement of the franchise has historically been important
both for the acquisition of the rights of full and effective
citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race, and for the
accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The
universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood
and democracy. The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of
dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody
counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth and power it
declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or
disgraced, we all belong to the same democratic South African
nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a single interactive
polity. Rights may not be limited without justification and
legislation dealing with the franchise must be interpreted in
favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement.24
To be sure, there are echoes of an equality principle within this statement,
particularly when the court acknowledges that South Africa has great
wealth disparities but that the vote signifies that every citizen is part of the
same democracy. This indicates that equality in voting is important. But
more significantly, the court explained why the right to vote is foundational
to its entire understanding of democracy and why taking that right away for
felons was unlawful: the vote is a “badge of dignity and personhood” that is
vital to South Africa’s governing structure.25 Voting, as an individual right,
underlies the entire formation of South African democracy.
The Canadian Supreme Court, too, recognizes the fundamental and
foundational nature of voting as the most important right to its democratic
order: “All forms of democratic government are founded upon the right to
vote. Without that right, democracy cannot exist. The marking of a ballot is

24. August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at para. 17 (S. Afr.); see also
Minister of Home Affairs v. Nat’l Inst. for Crime Prevention & the Re-integration of
Offenders 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) at para. 47 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he right to vote is foundational
to democracy which is a core value of our Constitution. In the light of our history where
denial of the right to vote was used to entrench white supremacy and to marginalise the great
majority of the people of our country, it is for us a precious right which must be vigilantly
respected and protected.”).
25. August, (4) BCLR 363 at para. 17.
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the mark of distinction of citizens of a democracy. It is a proud badge of
freedom.”26
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights declared that the
provision for “free elections” within the Convention on Human Rights27 is
“crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and
meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law.”28 Contracting States to
the Convention are thus obligated to take “positive measures” to provide
free elections “as opposed to merely refraining from interference.”29
Accordingly, “the right to vote is not a privilege,” and “the presumption in
a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion.”30 The right to vote is not
absolute, however, because governments must promulgate rules for a
smooth election; but “[a]ny departure from the principle of universal
suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus
elected and the laws which it promulgates.”31 The European Court of
Human Rights thus recognized the right to vote as foundational to the very
concept of a democracy: a “free election” is essential to legitimizing a
government and the laws it passes.32
These international courts understand the right to vote as going beyond
ensuring equality in the opportunity to participate; they instead require a
guarantee of participation and view voting as a fundamental right that is
inherent to an individual, as it represents an expression of democratic will
and self-governance. This is similar to the expressive value Professor
Flanders identifies in voting in the first part of his article.33 But Professor
Flanders then largely abandons the expressive value of participation in
favor of equality to decide election disputes. Understanding the right to vote

26. Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (Can.) (Cory, J., concurring); see also Sauvé v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (Can.) (“The right of all citizens to vote,
regardless of virtue or mental ability or other distinguishing features, underpins the
legitimacy of Canadian democracy and Parliament’s claim to power.”).
27. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Feb. 3, 1952 (entered into force May 5, 1954), available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
28. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, ¶ 58 (2005).
29. Id. ¶ 57.
30. Id. ¶ 59.
31. Id. ¶ 62. As examples of when contracting states may limit voting rights consistent
with maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the election procedure, the court noted
that governments may impose a minimum voting age to ensure maturity or a residency
requirement to identify those who have a stake in the country holding the election. Id.
32. See id. ¶ 58.
33. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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as vital to an individual’s self-worth within a democracy, however, should
lead us to focus on the foundational aspect of participation in resolving the
“voting wars.” If instead we conceive of voting controversies in the United
States as primarily involving equality, then we lag behind these other
democracies in recognizing the primacy of voting to the entire democratic
structure.
Affirming the ability of the broader, foundational role of participation to
resolve election disputes has several corollary effects. First, it impacts the
kinds of electoral errors we should correct and the obligation of the
government to provide for an open electoral process. Second, this
conception implicates the level of scrutiny courts should use when
construing a challenge to a voting regulation: the significance of the right to
vote counsels toward stricter scrutiny of election laws that impact the
individual right to vote.34 Third, this approach changes the way in which we
discuss voting rights. A focus on equality as the main basis for resolving
election disputes is very different from an emphasis on voting as the most
important, foundational right for our democratic structure.
The foundational nature of voting, as a right inherent to an individual
living in a democracy, underpins all that follows. Only when we fully
recognize this first principle can we meaningfully understand the kinds of
voting problems we must address and the proper role of government in
structuring our elections.
II. The Government’s Obligation in Regulating the Voting Process
Professor Flanders asserts that the government’s role in fostering voting
rights is simply to make sure the election process is “good enough.”35 By
conceptualizing the value of participation and its associated disputes as
mostly involving equality, it follows that providing equal access to
everyone is “good enough” so long as the government does not impose
“unreasonable obstacles.”36 There is no need for a guarantee of participation
for all.37 This makes sense if one starts from the premise that the value of
voting is primarily about equality, as the government’s obligation is simply
to foster that equality—and nothing more. But if we more fully embrace the
34. See Douglas, supra note 11, at 176, 186; Douglas, supra note 23.
35. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 75.
36. See id. at 70 (“[T]he state does not have an obligation to make it maximally easy for
people to vote; it has pragmatic and administrative concerns to tend to. The state just (and
this is a big ‘just’) has to remove unreasonable obstacles to voting. . . . People need only a
reasonable opportunity to participate, not a guarantee of participation . . . .”).
37. Id.
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foundational right to vote, then merely providing a reasonable and equal
opportunity to participate is not enough. This is because some voters may
be left behind in the process—infringing their fundamental right to vote.
Instead, there should be a concerted effort to make voting as easy as
practicable, consistent with the government’s regulatory and administrative
needs and economic realities. An “as easy as practicable” standard elevates
the importance of guaranteeing voter opportunities for all, while still giving
governments some room to regulate elections. Put differently, there should
be a guarantee of participation for every eligible voter, subject only to the
government’s justifiable constraints. Courts should therefore strike down
election practices that place unnecessary burdens on the right to vote, even
if the laws have an equal effect on all voters.
This debate has relevance both pragmatically and jurisprudentially. If
equality alone answers most voting disputes, and if the government does
not have an obligation to make voting as easy as practicable, then the
government might revert to the least common denominator; there would be
little incentive to improve the voting process. For instance, long lines of
voters waiting for several hours might be fine so long as everyone must
wait the same length of time. This inquiry also implicates the level of
scrutiny courts will apply to voting challenges. Assenting to the equality
concept for the value of participation leaves little room for courts to
mandate governmental improvement in election processes; embracing the
foundational principle of voting aspires to more. This Part considers the
practical issue of long lines, courts’ responses to the long lines problem,
and the broader debate regarding the correct judicial test to scrutinize
election law challenges.
A. The Problem of Equally Long Lines
Professor Flanders suggests that long lines by themselves are not a major
issue that requires a judicial fix.38 So long as there are no disparities among
districts and precincts in the length of time voters must wait (which,
admittedly, is not true in our current system),39 then the government has no
further duty to shorten the wait time to vote. This leads to two concerns.
38. Professor Flanders agrees that long lines by themselves are an “outrage.” See id. at
74. But his approach, in my view, does not provide a workable theoretical framework to fix
the problem.
39. See, e.g., David Damron & Scott Powers, Researcher: Long Lines at Polls Caused
49,000 Not to Vote, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 29, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/
2012-12-29/news/os-discouraged-voters-20121229_1_long-lines-higher-turnout-election-day
(discussing a study of Florida’s 2012 Election Day lines).
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First, research shows that long lines are a problem by themselves, even if
there is no inequality in who must endure waiting in those lines. Second,
from a policy perspective, this approach provides no incentive for the
government to improve the voting experience.
Long lines “effectively den[y] millions the right to vote,” especially
because the “psychological implications of waiting in long lines have a
significant impact on the amount of time someone is able to spend in a line
waiting to vote.”40 One psychologist has stated that “‘waiting in line is often
experienced as an obstruction.’”41 Long lines depress voter turnout:
according to testimony from voting expert Professor Stephen Ansolabehere
at a Senate Rules Committee hearing on voter registration, during the 2008
election, four percent of registered non-voters did not vote because of long
lines at the polls.42 This equates to about 1.67 million registered voters who
were either unable or chose not to vote because of long lines, illustrating the
deterrent effect of a long wait time to vote.43
Professor Flanders’s approach would address this concern only if the
lines are unevenly dispersed throughout the country, as this would pose an
equality problem.44 But what if we had equally long lines everywhere?
Excessively long lines by themselves are concerning for the right to vote as
a foundational concept, regardless of whether some voters suffered longer
wait times than others. That is, the deterrent effect of a long line for any
particular voter is problematic irrespective of whether every precinct in the
country had an equal percentage of people fail to vote because of long lines.
The equality rationale, however, would provide no judicial relief in this
situation because everyone must endure the same excessively long wait to

40. Boe M. Piras, Note, Long Lines at the Polls Violate Equal Protection and Require
Judicial and Legislative Action, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 658, 658, 670 (2009).
41. Id. at 670 (quoting Thierry Meyer, Subjective Importance of Goal and Reactions to
Waiting in Line, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 820 (1994)).
42. Voter Registration: Assessing Current Problems: Hearing Before the S. Rules Comm.,
111th Cong. 15 (2009) (testimony of Stephen Ansolabehere), available at http://www.vote.
caltech.edu/content/united-states-senate-committee-rules-and-administration (follow hyperlink
under “Attachment”). Of those registered non-voters who tried and failed to vote, 8.1% did not
vote because of long lines. Id. at 20. Three percent of registered non-voters who chose not to go
to the polls at all pointed to the potential for long lines as the reason. Id.
43. Piras, supra note 40, at 660; see also id. at 673 (“These statistics are staggering and
support the notion that the psychological impact of waiting in lines is real and it deters a
substantial number of voters in every election. Not only do long lines have psychological
implications for the elections in which they occur, psychological implications of long lines
can also have significant lasting effects . . . .”).
44. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 74-75.
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vote. This approach fails to recognize that a long line might deny the right
to vote for some people who cannot wait, even if all voters are treated the
same.
Long lines also could impact the result of a close election. In a study of
the 2008 presidential primary in California, 1.89% of voters “reneged,” or
waited in line but left without voting.45 The margin of victory in some
recent elections has been lower than this rate—suggesting a tangible effect
of long lines on close races.46 Professor Flanders’s approach, however,
provides few answers to these problems if, hypothetically, the long wait
was the same for the entire electoral population. Focusing principally on
equality in participation leaves these several million voters without a
practical remedy for improving the voting process.47
We should address long lines that cause over a million people not to
vote, regardless of whether the long line problem is spread across the
country evenly. Our democratic system suffers when the system itself
precludes people from voting. As one commentator stated, “election
officials have an affirmative duty to create an election system that provides
an adequate and substantially equal opportunity to vote for all voters.”48 An
election that effectively excludes over a million voters because of long lines
is not adequate, regardless of whether the government has substantially
achieved equality in the voting process.
B. Judicial Consideration of the Long Line Problem
Recognizing the government’s obligation to provide easy access to the
polls also impacts judicial resolution of cases challenging long lines. Four
courts have considered explicitly the long lines problem. In two cases,
courts found that long lines were a concern, invoking a broader

45. Douglas M. Spencer & Zachary S. Markovits, Long Lines at Polling Stations?
Observations from an Election Day Field Study, 9 ELECTION L.J. 3, 15-16 (2010) (reporting
observations from thirty polling stations in three counties).
46. See Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1, 18
(2013).
47. Professor Mike Pitts, in his well-written response to Professor Flanders, suggests
that Professor Flanders’s embrace of an expressive value in voting answers the problem of
equally-distributed long lines. See Pitts, supra note 5, at 106 n.27. That may be so as a
theoretical matter, but it is still unclear how the expressive value would work in the practical
setting of a lawsuit. Courts, therefore, would have only a murky doctrinal hook with which
to handle the issue. Moreover, the focus on the equality ideal masks the efficacy of the
expressive value of participation.
48. Piras, supra note 40, at 658 (emphasis added).
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jurisprudential lens than the equality rationale would allow.49 The other two
cases embraced equality as the focus: in one case, the court found no
inequality and therefore provided no remedy for the long lines.50 The other
opinion took issue with long lines, but primarily under an equality
rationale.51 The more restrictive analysis of these latter cases portends
judicial sanctioning of greater limits on voting rights.
First, in Ury v. Santee, the court invalidated a city election because some
qualified voters “were forced to wait unreasonable lengths of time to obtain
and cast their ballots . . . as a result of the consolidation of 32 precincts into
six precincts.”52 The court found that there had been an “effective
deprivation of plaintiffs’ right to vote,” as the United States Constitution
includes a right for citizens to have “a reasonable opportunity to vote in
local elections, that is, to be given reasonable access to the voting place, to
be able to vote within a reasonable time and in a private and enclosed
space.”53 Although the court commented on the inequality between the
largest and smallest precincts,54 the focus of the discussion was on the city’s
failure “to provide adequate and equal voting facilities for all of the
qualified voters who desired to cast their ballot on such date.”55 That is, the
court found a violation based on the city’s inability to set up an adequate
voting process, separate from and in addition to the equality issue.
More recently, just prior to the 2008 presidential election, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an
injunction in NAACP v. Cortes requiring any precincts where half of the
electronic machines malfunctioned to distribute paper ballots, in part to
ward off long lines.56 The court observed:
[W]e would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that many
individuals have a limited window of opportunity to go to the
polls due to their jobs, child care and family responsibilities, or
49. See NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortes, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765-67 (E.D.
Pa. 2008); Ury v. Santee, 303 F. Supp. 119, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
50. See In re Election Contest as to Watertown Special Referendum Election of Oct. 26,
1999, 2001 SD 62, ¶ 9, 628 N.W.2d 336, 339 & n.2.
51. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir.
2008).
52. 303 F. Supp. at 124.
53. Id. at 125-26.
54. See id. at 123.
55. Id. at 125.
56. NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortes, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765, 767-68 (E.D.
Pa. 2008).
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other weighty commitments. Life does not stop on election day.
Many must vote early or in the evening if they are to vote at
all.57
Because “[t]he right to vote is at the foundation of our constitutional form
of government” and “all our freedoms depend on it,” the court declared
unacceptable long lines due to inoperable machines.58 Although the court
stated that delay from broken machines would risk violating the Equal
Protection Clause (likely to follow Supreme Court jurisprudence on voting
rights), the focus of the analysis was not on equality but instead on the
deprivation for “many citizens of their right to vote.”59
Contrast that analysis with the discussion in a 1999 election contest in
South Dakota.60 The court heard evidence that many voters had to wait
between forty-five and ninety minutes to vote, that parking at the polling
station was inadequate, and that some voters showed up several times
throughout the day but never voted because the lines were too long.61 The
Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected the challenge to the election
results (which had a margin of victory of thirty-four votes out of over 3300
ballots cast) because “[m]ere inconvenience or delay in voting is not
enough to overturn an election.”62 As there was only one voting location,
moreover, there was no plausible equal protection argument: all voters had
the potential to endure the same lines, as they all voted at the same place.63
Although the court did not say so explicitly, its analysis epitomized the
equality rationale of participation: so long as everyone’s experience is
theoretically equal, there is no voting irregularity—even if many people
were practically unable to vote because of long lines.
Finally, in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, the Sixth Circuit
held that Ohio’s voting mechanics were insufficient, but it did so mostly
under the Equal Protection Clause.64 The court explained that:
Voters were forced to wait from two to twelve hours to vote
because of inadequate allocation of voting machines. Voting
57. Id. at 765.
58. Id. at 767.
59. See id. at 765.
60. Compare id., with In re Election Contest as to Watertown Special Referendum
Election of Oct. 26, 1999, 2001 SD 62, 628 N.W.2d 336.
61. In re Election Contest, ¶ 6, 628 N.W.2d at 338.
62. See id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 628 N.W.2d at 338-39.
63. See id. ¶¶ 3, 8-9, 628 N.W.2d at 338-39 & n.2.
64. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir.
2008).
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machines were not allocated proportionately to the voting
population, causing more severe wait times in some counties
than in others. At [at] least one polling place, voting was not
completed until 4:00 a.m. on the day following election day.
Long wait times caused some voters to leave their polling places
without voting in order to attend school, work, or to family
responsibilities or because a physical disability prevented them
from standing in line.65
The court acknowledged the problem of long lines, without tying it
specifically to disparities across districts; yet it chastised Ohio’s election
administration on equal protection grounds.66 That is, unlike in the other
case that found a violation because of the inherent problem in long lines for
everyone, the court’s focus was instead on whether the long lines produced
inequality for some voters as compared to others. This demonstrates that the
equality rationale can be a valuable tool in ensuring a fair electoral process.
The court, however, never stated whether the long lines themselves were a
concern separate from the inequality in the length of lines across the state.
This further analysis would have better signaled the foundational
importance of the right to vote.
If we countenance solely a limited equality rationale for resolving issues
about electoral participation and voter access, then the courts in the South
Dakota election contest and the Ohio long lines case were correct. The
South Dakota court ruled that there were no voting irregularities, despite the
fact that the number of potential voters who did not vote due to long lines
exceeded the margin of victory, because there was no inequality in who was
forced to wait in the long lines. This election involved a single polling
place, so it was impossible to find inequality in how the state treated voters
because everyone endured the same lines at the same location.67 The Sixth
Circuit in the Ohio case found problems with Ohio’s election system based
on equal protection principles, not under due process or another doctrine
that would recognize the importance of participation as going beyond
equality. But these courts failed to take the next step and consider also
whether the election regulations impeded the exercise of voting qua voting,
separate from whether there was unequal treatment. That is, the courts did
65. Id. at 477-78.
66. See id. at 476-78. The court also found a violation of substantive due process but
spent very little time on the analysis. See id. at 478-79.
67. See In re Election Contest, ¶ 8, 628 N.W.2d at 339. The court did not discuss
whether the length of the line at the polling place differed throughout the day.
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not look beyond equality to determine if the election practices also impeded
the right to vote itself as a fundamental right.
If, however, we properly understand participation and its associated
conflicts as having broader implications that encompass the foundational
right to vote, then these courts were incorrect in their legal analyses.
Instead, the approaches in both Cortes and Ury were better because,
separate from whether the wait times were unequal, the courts recognized
that long lines deter too many voters from participating in the democratic
process. The foundational role the courts placed on voting dictated the
interpretive lens through which they resolved these disputes. The courts that
provided greater protection for individual voters—a norm we should
embrace—went beyond equality and endorsed voting as a foundational and
fundamental right.
The equality principle for resolving disputes about participation is too
narrow and, therefore, is insufficient. Abandoning equality as an important
level of protection is unwarranted, but it should not be the only
consideration in fostering voting rights and setting up our electoral system.
If we properly recognize the significance of participation in its broader
sense, then it follows that the government has an affirmative duty to make
voting as easy as practicable to promote that participation, subject to
administrative burdens and economic realities. It means that lines that are
too long so as actually to deter voting are a problem regardless of whether
voters in only some jurisdictions suffer from those lines.
C. The Proper Judicial Test for Infringement of Voting Rights
This debate impacts how courts should approach other election
administration cases beyond just the issue of long lines. Current Supreme
Court jurisprudence generally adheres to the equality principle, focusing
mainly on whether the government is providing equal access to all voters.
The United States Constitution does not specifically grant a right to vote,
but “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”68 Under the current Anderson-Burdick “severe burden” test,
courts ask whether a challenged voting regulation imposes a “severe”
burden on a particular group or class of voters.69 If it does, then the court
68. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); see also Douglas, supra
note 23.
69. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S.
279, 289 (1992)); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983). Professor
Justin Levitt has cogently explained how the severe burden test suffers from the
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applies strict scrutiny review.70 If the law does not impose a severe
burden—the more typical approach—then the court analyzes the
government’s election administration under a deferential lower level of
scrutiny, balancing the burdens the law does impose against the state’s
regulatory interests.71 The Equal Protection Clause thereby both defines the
right to vote and delineates its scope. This has a tangible impact on the way
courts construe challenges to how the government runs an election,
especially because it means that courts will usually sanction the
government’s election practices.
But understanding the broader implications of participation means that
courts should look beyond the current highly-deferential jurisprudence of
the Equal Protection Clause—perhaps to due process principles—in
reviewing challenges to voting regulations.72 Courts should embrace
heightened review, such as through a wider use of strict scrutiny, when
considering election law disputes.73 Indeed, some lower courts have alluded
to invoking more robust protections, particularly by recognizing voters’ due
process rights. For instance, several federal courts in Ohio expressed
concerns about the due process implications of Ohio’s law involving
provisional ballots.74 The law prohibited election boards from counting the
ballot of a voter who showed up at the correct polling place but went to the

“denominator problem,” in that Supreme Court Justices have varied as to “what is the
relevant total population in the case of burdens like excessive lines that are unevenly, though
not necessarily discriminatorily, distributed.” Justin Levitt, Long Lines at the Courthouse:
Pre-Election Litigation of Election Day Burdens, 9 ELECTION L.J. 19, 33 (2010)
(highlighting the differing approaches from the various opinions in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)). For a further discussion of the indeterminacy
of the Anderson-Burdick test, see Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
70. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34.
71. See id. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788); see also id. at 433 (“[T]he mere
fact that a State’s system creates barriers . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny.”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89.
72. See Douglas, supra note 23 (explaining the current “severe burden” test and
advocating for courts to use strict scrutiny).
73. See id.; see also Piras, supra note 40, at 667 (“[C]ourts must be explicit in affirming
that a wait that exceeds two hours strongly indicates a breach in the government officials’
duty to provide an election system that does not deprive voters of their fundamental rights
and would trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.”).
74. See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 243 (6th Cir. 2011)
(expressing “substantial constitutional concerns” related to due process); Hunter v. Hamilton
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 844 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
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wrong precinct at that location due to poll worker error.75 The Sixth Circuit,
in agreeing with the district court that due process would not allow this
practice, declared that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects against
extraordinary voting restrictions that render the voting system
‘fundamentally unfair.’”76 Thus, there are touches of due process
considerations in election law jurisprudence that heighten the level of
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, however, has not embraced a due process
understanding of voting, at least in recent election law cases.77 Although the
Court once declared that “[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of
one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions
on that right strike at the heart of representative government,”78 current
Supreme Court jurisprudence has pulled back from this broader notion of
voting rights to embrace the more restrictive equality ideal. Under this
analysis, the government usually enjoys deferential review of its election
regulations. The presumption is in favor of the government’s election
practice, and a voter-plaintiff has a high burden to challenge the law
successfully. The Court should instead revert to its original understanding
of voting as supporting the foundation of our democratic structure.79 In
doing so, it will elevate the importance of the right to vote and require
heightened scrutiny of election challenges. The government should have the
75. Hunter, 635 F.3d at 243.
76. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 597 (6th Cir. 2012); see
also Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Husted, 887 F. Supp. 2d 761, 794-95 (S.D. Ohio
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless, 696 F.3d 580,
aff’d, 515 F. App’x 539 (6th Cir. 2013).
77. As Professor Ned Foley has explained, one might read a due process strand within
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), based on the Court’s finding of an “arbitrary denial of the
fundamental right to vote,” but that even this due process conception has an equal protection
component because it “require[s] inequality in the treatment of voters to establish a valid
claim.” Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 960-61
(2007). Professor Pam Karlan explicitly faulted the Court’s analysis in that case for failing to
recognize the substantial due process interest in voting. Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection,
Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 490
(2002); see also Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined
the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 562-64, 574,
578 (2001) (describing the possible due process arguments for the right to vote within Bush
v. Gore).
78. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
79. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free
of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by
the Constitution . . . .”).
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burden of proving that its election regulations are necessary and do not
infringe voters’ rights too much. That is, because voting is a fundamental
right, the presumption should be in favor of the voter instead of the
government. This in turn will force the government to make voting as easy
as practically possible. Put simply, if a plaintiff can show that the
government can make voting easier without undue regulatory or economic
difficulties, then courts should obligate the government to do so. It should
ultimately be the government’s burden to justify its voting rules.
This is not to say that states should lose every voting case. Governments
have important administrative needs, and not all voting changes are
inexpensive. As the Supreme Court has stated, “as a practical matter, there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.”80 States have to maintain the integrity of elections and ward off
fraud, and state coffers are not unlimited. But employing heightened
scrutiny for infringements on the right to vote does not require the
invalidation of every election law, as the government can often demonstrate
that its voting regulation is the least intrusive and narrowest means of
achieving a fair, smooth, and fraud-free election.
The precise contours of a refined judicial test are beyond the scope of
this Response, but it suffices to say that courts should scrutinize state
election regulations more carefully to ensure they do not infringe an
individual’s right to vote without sufficient justification. That is, courts
should not simply rubberstamp a government’s election law rules through
deferential review. If a plaintiff can show that there is a relatively
inexpensive and effective way to improve the election process—even if
there is no current inequality in voting—then there is no reason not to
require the government to update its election administration in this way. Put
differently, if the government can run an election in a manner that opens the
doors more easily for more voters who would otherwise face some barrier
to vote—and if the reform does not impose too great of a burden on the
state to enact—then why should our laws not mandate that? This is not to
suggest that a court should involve itself in the day-to-day minutia of
election administration, especially if a proposed reform will not have much
of an impact on the ability to vote. Moreover, states have valid budgetary
and administrative limitations in running an election. But if a plaintiff can
prove that a government’s current election practice impedes the ability of
some voters to cast a ballot, and can also offer an alternative that is feasible
80. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
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for the government to adopt, then courts should order that result. This
approach best protects an individual’s fundamental right to vote.
Focusing primarily on equality in participation allows us to excuse
government election practices that do not make voting as easy as
practicable because it leaves room to infringe the individual right to vote
without a good enough reason. It could, for instance, allow states to enact
stricter barriers to voting that affect everyone the same. Embracing more
fully the foundational status of voting as a fundamental right, by contrast,
places a greater obligation on the government. States should not be allowed
to skirt by in providing an electoral process that is merely focused on
equality. If we are concerned about only equality, then that is all that states
will achieve. The equality ideal allows a presumption in favor of the
government and against voter challenges. To stay consistent with the
foundational importance of voting, not to mention to remain in line with the
rest of the world’s democracies, we need to switch that presumption. By
aspiring to more—while still recognizing that states must regulate elections
and that governments have limited resources—we can make the voting
process smoother and open it up to more participants.
III. Conclusion
Placing the meaning of participation and voting in the proper theoretical
context answers various corollary questions about how courts should
construe election challenges and how governments should structure their
elections. If the “voting wars” are mainly about equality, then courts will
almost always defer to a government’s choices about how to run the
election, so long as there are no obvious equality concerns. Governments
would only have an obligation to administer an election that is “good
enough.” But this minimizes the significance of voting as a foundational
right to our democracy and leaves many voters out of the process. If we
more fully embrace the foundational concept of voting, we better adhere to
what democracies all over the world recognize: that the democratic
structure starts with the right to vote. Moreover, courts should consider
more than just the value of equality in voting and should scrutinize the
administration of an election more closely to ensure fundamental fairness
and easy access to the democratic process. The right to vote has
foundational and fundamental importance beyond equality. Courts and
legislatures should regulate the election process accordingly.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss1/4

